The leadership to cultivate and promote technological innovation is one of the most important aspects of a CEO's human capital. We investigate how this leadership affects a CEO's attractiveness on the outside directorship market. We find a robust positive relation between innovation performance of a CEO's own firm and the number of outside directorships held by this CEO, which is primarily determined by appointing firms that are also innovative. We also find that the presence of innovative CEO-directors on a firm's board significantly improves its innovation and operating performance in post-appointment years. Our results demonstrate that a CEO's leadership in cultivating and promoting innovation is highly valued in the market for outside directorship. These results also suggest that innovative CEO-directors constitute an important mechanism to propagate knowledge on innovation across firms. 
Introduction
The leadership to cultivate and promote technological innovation is one of the most important aspects of a Chief Executive Officer's (CEO) human capital. This type of leadership is scarce because it builds on a CEO's acumen in a firm's external environment (e.g., customer demands, industry dynamics and legal context) as well as her in-depth understanding of her own corporation (e.g., human and capital resources, corporate culture and corporate procedures). In today's fast moving economy, firms need innovations to thrive. Innovativeness, therefore, is more important for firms' success than ever before. Although the provision of innovation leadership is vested with the incumbent managers, the scarcity and complexity of innovation leadership and the limitation on incumbent managers' resources and expertise often require them to seek external advice. By appointing the CEO of an innovative firm onto its board, a firm can benefit from this CEO's expertise and experience. Recent studies underscore the value of a CEO's human capital on a firm's innovation activities and show that the CEO's observable human capital (such as their personal networks and general managerial skills gained over their education and work experience) and unobservable ability (measured by manager fixed effects) impact the variation in a firm's innovation performance (Chemmanur et al. 2014 , Cho et al. 2016 , Custodio et al. 2015 , Faleye et al. 2014 . In this paper, we ask whether a CEO's proven ability to cultivate and promote innovation in her own firm is recognized by the labour market for outside directors and how the appointing firms benefit from the appointment of an innovative CEO-director.
Where needed, we also call a CEO's own firm the "sender" firm to distinguish it from the other company that appoint this CEO as an outside director.
CEOs from other firms are the most desired candidates for a company's outside directors. 1 With their power of dispensing resources as well as knowledge and experience of making decisions in complex organizations, CEO-directors are able to counsel incumbent managers in a way that other outside directors are not able to (Fahlenbrach et al. 2010 ). Fama and Jensen (1983) suggests that the external labour market recognizes CEOs' human capital primarily by their performance as decision managers in their own firms. Related research also provides empirical 1 See Young (1990) and more recent survey in Spencer Stuart Board Index (2003) evidence to support this view. These studies mainly focus on the past operating performance of a CEO's own company. Ferris et al. (2003) show that past firm performance has a positive effect on the number of directorships held by a CEO. Fich (2005) finds that CEOs of firms with better operating performance are more likely to be appointed as outside directors. Brickley et al. (1999) observe that the number of directorships held by retired CEOs is positively related to the firm performance prior to their retirement. Similarly, if the market for outside directors is efficient, a CEO's success in cultivating innovation in her own firm should have similar certification effect, which in turn results in more outside directorships held by this CEO.
By appointing innovative CEO-directors, a firm can benefit from enhancing the effectiveness of board monitoring and advising. Meanwhile, since the number of innovative CEOs is limited, if a firm can successfully appoint an innovative CEO-director, it will reveal a strong signal of the firm's quality to the market. We expect these effects to be especially strong for innovative appointing firms because these firms' demand for innovation leadership is better met by the supply of CEOs from innovative firms.
To test this hypothesis, we follow the recent literature on innovation (e.g., Aghion et al. (2013) , Hall et al. (2005) , Hirshleifer et al. (2013) , Kogan et al. (2012) ) to use patenting activities to measure firm innovativeness. To measure a CEO's popularity on the external director market, we use the actual number of a CEO's outside directorship as well as the number of outside directorships weighted by the appointing firm's innovativeness. Our empirical analysis relies on a dataset containing non-financial and non-utility firms in the S&P 1500 index spanning the period from 2000 to 2008. We find a strong positive relation between firm innovativeness and a CEO's attractiveness the labour market for outside directors. The CEOs of firms with better innovation outcomes (measured by patent counts and citation counts) are more likely to serve as outside directors on other firms' board, and they also hold more outside directorships than CEOs of less innovative firms do. This finding is robust to using different measures of innovativeness.
Firm random effect weakens but does not eliminate this positive effect, which suggests both firm and individual attributes contribute to an innovative CEO's attractiveness on the labour market for outside directors. Furthermore, consistent with the view that innovative CEO-directors are especially valuable for innovative firms, we find that the effect of firm innovativeness on the 3 number of outside directorships is primarily driven by director appointment made by innovative firms.
Endogeneity occurs when there are omitted variables or unobservables that affect firm innovativeness as well as the number of a CEO's outside directorships. To address this issue, we estimate two-stage least square (2SLS) regressions, instrumenting firm innovativeness using the urban industrial diversity, which is the diversity of industries in the county where the firm is headquartered. The prior literature argues that most innovations are made and spread in cities because the flow of information and ideas across people is easier. The industrial diversification in urban areas facilitates knowledge transfer across industries by reducing the searching costs, providing cross-industry inspirations and expertise, as well as provisions of alternative components on their new products (see Glaeser et al. (1992) and Duranton and Puga (2001) ). Our first stage regression confirms that urban industrial diversity has a significant positive effect on firm innovativeness. At the same time, we are not aware of any prior literature suggesting that urban industrial diversity directly impacts a CEO's popularity on the market for outside directorship.
When we include urban industrial diversity in our second stage regressions, we cannot reject the null that it does not impact the number of a CEO's outside directorship. After controlling for endogeneity, the positive effect of firm innovativeness on the number of outside directorships persists. Our results are also robust to several other robustness checks, such as addressing reverse causality, removing self-citations, and further controlling for CEO overconfidence and ownership.
To establish the relevance of appointing an innovative CEO-director, we proceed to examine how such appointment impacts the appointing firms innovation and operating performance. Recent works on boards of directors have emphasized that outside directors' advisory role, which built on their expertise (for example, experience in related industries, political influence, and financial expertise), significantly impacts firm value and performance (Adams and Ferreira 2007 , Dass et al. 2014 , Güner et al. 2008 , Masulis et al. 2012 , Meyerinck et al. 2015 , Wang et al. 2015 .
With the expertise and knowledge of leading a firm's innovation, innovative CEO-directors enhance the appointing firms innovation performance by counselling incumbent managers on their 4 innovative strategy. Further, if innovation successfully translates into productivity, one should also observe improved operating performance. Furthermore, recent literature underscores that friendly and tolerant boards have an impact on motivating innovation (Manso 2011 , Kang et al. 2014 ). Innovative CEO-directors can better understand the risk and difficulty of undertaking innovative projects and are more tolerant of failure of innovation activities. According to Adams and Ferreira (2007) , such tolerance and understanding could lead to better information transfer between managers and directors and result in better monitoring and advising. To evaluate how appointing an innovative CEO-director impacts firm's innovation performance, we adopt a difference-in-difference approach to address potential concerns due to firms' endogenous choice of outside directors. Empirically, we require our sample firm to have at least one patent before appointing an innovative CEO. In this way, we exclude firms whose productive function doesn't use innovation as input. Within this sample, we define the treatment sample as those appointing a CEO from an innovative (i.e. with at least one patent outcome during sample period) firm and the control sample as those appointing a CEO from a non-innovative (i.e. with zero patent outcome during sample period) firm. Consistent with our expectation, we find that firms with innovative CEO-directors outperform control firms in terms of innovation output in the three post-appointment years, and this outperformance is more pronounced when the CEO-director's own firm is more innovative (i.e., with more patent outcome), the technological proximity between the appointing and the sender firm (Jaffe 1986) is higher, and the appointing firm invests more on R&D. In addition, we find that firms appointing innovative CEO-directors have better operating performance in the post-appointment years, suggesting enhanced innovation capacity translate into productivity.
Our paper contributes to the literature in three ways. First, we add to the literature on CEOdirectors (e.g., Beavers and Mobbs (2015) , Fahlenbrach et al. (2010 ), Fich (2005 , Perry and Peyer (2005) ). The prior literature demonstrates that a CEO's likelihood of taking outside directorship is affected by both the demand side factors (e.g., complexity of the appointing firm (Booth and Deli 1996) , certification of firm quality (Fama and Jensen 1983) and the number of local firms (Knyazeva et al. 2013) ) and the supply side factors (e.g., career concern (Aghion et al. 2013 , Holmström 1999 , building bonding relationship with other firms (Booth and Deli 5 1996) and information transfer across firms (Dass et al. 2014) ). To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first to analyze how a CEO's leadership of promoting innovation affects his availability and popularity on the market for outside directors.
Second, our paper suggests that appointing CEO-directors is a possible channel of knowledge transfer across firms. In particular, through appointing CEOs of innovative firms onto the board, a firm can fill the knowledge gap between different technology fields and identify new industry and technology trends, which in turn improves the firm's innovation output. Moreover, our findings further confirm the important role of managerial quality in promoting technological innovation (Chemmanur et al. 2014 , Cho et al. 2016 , Custodio et al. 2015 .
Third, we contribute to the growing literature on the advisory role of corporate board (Adams et al. 2010) . Recent studies postulate that directors with particular expertise, such as experience in related industries and financial expertise, are especially valuable for the firm (Dass et al. 2014 , Güner et al. 2008 , Masulis et al. 2012 , Meyerinck et al. 2015 . We extend this literature by showing that the leadership of cultivating and promoting technological innovation is a valuable trait sought after in the market for outside directors. Related, our finding provides practical guidance for firms who seek advice from outside directors. This enhances the practicability of our finding.
The rest of the paper continues as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature and develops our main hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data and variable construction. Section 4 examines the relation between firm innovativeness and the number of outside directorships held by CEOs.
Section 5 investigates the impact of innovative CEO directors on the appointing firms. Section 6 concludes.
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2 Literature Review and Development of Hypotheses
Demand for innovative CEO-directors
Innovation is a driving factor in today's fast moving economy, but identifying future technology and industry trends is challenging and risky, it requires managers to deeply understand the firm's internal operation and also external environment the firm faces. However, managers' knowledge and experience are limited, a rational CEO with the objective to maximize shareholder value should seek external advice from perceived experts to make more effective strategic decisions.
With the expertise of its members, a corporate board can counsel incumbent managers and contribute their opinions to making valuable corporate strategy and operating policy.
Growing research attention is being devoted to the advisory role of corporate boards and the importance of director expertise. Coles et al. (2008) examine the impact of board structure on firm value and highlight the advisory role of the board. They find that firms with greater advisory requirements have more outside directors on their boards, which is consistent with Dalton et al. (1999) , Hermalin and Weisbach (1988) demonstrating that firms choose outside directors who can bring valuable experience and expertise to counsel the incumbent management team. Faleye et al. (2013) find that advisory directors hold more advanced education degrees, entrepreneurial background, CEO-level and board-level experience than other directors. Firms with advisory directors on the board are also associated with better strategic outcomes, such as higher acquisition returns, better-quality corporate innovation and higher firm value. Dass et al. (2014) investigate the impact of directors' industry experience on firm performance. They find that firms tend to appoint outside directors from related industries when they face larger information gap or have greater market power. Furthermore, they show that appointing outside directors from related industries significantly improves firm performance and helps the firm handle industry shocks better. Given these findings, we expect that CEOs of innovative firms are best suited to serve as outside directors in other firms to fulfil their advisory needs. Since their human capital is more specialized on innovation, we predict that innovative CEO-directors are more demanded by innovative firms.
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Besides the advising benefit, appointing CEOs of innovative firms as outside directors onto the board may also increase the effectiveness of board monitoring, especially in innovative firms. Jensen (1993) points out that lack of expertise to fully understand related information is one of the major problems hindering directors to effectively monitor incumbent managers. Since the information gap between managers and board is likely to be greater in innovative firms, having innovative CEO-directors can help the board better understand innovation-related information, which in turn increases the effectiveness of board monitoring. Adams and Ferreira (2007) confirm this insight and further suggest that management-friendly boards perform better on monitoring and advising incumbent managers. In order to receive valuable advice from outside directors, a CEO has to provide relevant inside information to them. However, outside directors have low tolerance for manager's poor performance (Weisbach 1988) , the more information a CEO reveals to outside directors, the greater the risk to this CEO that the board will monitor him more intensively. Consequently, a CEO is more likely to share information with the board when the board is friendly or the expertise of board members is particularly valuable.
In addition, Manso (2011) emphasizes that substantial tolerance for failure of innovative activities is important when a firm desires the managerial incentive scheme to motivate innovation.
He suggests that the appointment of outside directors who are friendly to manager could result in better innovation outcomes. Kang et al. (2014) provide empirical evidence to support this insight and show that firms with friendly boards produce more patents and citations. In short, we predict that, unlike typical outside directors, innovative CEO-directors are more likely to understand the risk and difficulty of undertaking innovative projects and therefore have more tolerance for failure of innovation activities. This tolerance can lead to better information transfer between managers and boards and in turn result in better monitoring and advising effect.
Another possible motivation of appointing CEOs of innovative firms as outside directors is the certification benefit. Because of the limited number of talented CEOs available in the labour market, if a firm can succeed in appointing an outside CEO on its board, it will reveal a strong certification of the firm quality to the market. This certification effect could be especially valuable for innovative firms since they face much more risk to undertake innovation projects and their value largely depends on realizing valuable future growth opportunities. The prior em-pirical studies have highlighted this insight. Fich (2005) finds positive stock market reactions to CEO director appointments and that CEOs of well-performing firms are more popular on the directorship market. Ferris et al. (2003) also contend that directors who serve larger and better performing firms are more likely to attract directorships. More recently, Fahlenbrach et al. (2010) further investigate director appointments use a large sample over the period from 1989 to 2002 and also find higher stock market reactions to the CEO director appointments than the appointments of another type of outside directors, but only when it is the firm's first CEO director appointment.
Supply of innovative CEO-directors
As the firm leader, a CEO's time and effort are valuable and limited. Accepting outside directorships requires CEOs to put an extra amount of effort out of their own firms, and if CEOs accept outside directorships, in order to protect their reputation, they cannot considerably shirk their responsibility on the board. Consequently, holding too many outside directorships will reduce the time a CEO committed to her own firm, a rational CEO will accept outside directorships with his own firm's permission only when the total benefit from outside directorship jobs exceeds the opportunity cost of the time devoted to this job. Motivated by this insight, we predict that CEOs are more likely to serve on boards of firms with knowledge and information that are valuable to their main employing firms. For CEOs of innovative firms, outside directorship could be especially valuable, because it provides a possible channel to establish networks and keep a close eye on the external environment such as technology trends and industry dynamics (Faleye et al. 2014) , which would eventually enhance a firm's ability to against industrial shocks and realize future growth opportunity.
Cultivating and promoting innovation is challenging and contains a lot of uncertainty, it may take many years to have a patent grant and even longer to translate innovation outcome into profits. As mentioned in Aghion et al. (2013) and Holmström (1999) , concerns about the failure of innovation will reduce managers' motivation to promote innovation unless the external competition is very high. Meanwhile, Fama and Jensen (1983) demonstrate that outside direc-torships can be an independent certification and signal of the executive's managerial ability to internal and external markets. Masulis and Mobbs (2014) conclude that enhancing reputation is one of the most important incentives for accepting outside directorship jobs. Therefore, when intense product market competition forces CEOs to innovate, in order to secure their job position, rational CEOs should accept outside directorships to reveal a strong signal of their ability.
Based on this career concern theory, we predict that CEOs of innovative firms are more likely to accept outside directorships in prestigious firms with good innovation outcome so that they can have more certification gains.
To sum up, based on our supply and demand analysis of the labour market for innovative CEOdirectors, we predict that CEOs of innovative firms are more likely to hold outside directorships, and the number of outside directorships held by them is positively related to the level of firm innovativeness. We also expect this effect to be more pronounced when the appointing firms are also innovative. In addition, we expect that appointing CEOs of innovative firms onto its board has a positive impact on the firm's innovation performance in the post appointment years.
Sample and Data

Sample construction
Our sample consists of firms in the S&P 1500 index, excluding financial firms, utilities and firms headquartered out of US. 2 We use several databases to construct our sample. The BoardEX database provides information on CEO and board characteristics. Standard and Poor's Execucomp provides CEO and board ownership data and CEO option compensation data used to construct CEO overconfidence measure. All accounting data are from Compustat, and stock return data are from CRSP. Patent data are from the dataset used in Kogan et al. (2012) , which provides detailed information on more than 4 million patents grants from to 1926 to 2010. We observe that the number of patent applications that are eventually granted drops dramatically 
Measures of innovativeness
Following the innovation literature, we rely on patent data to measure firm innovativeness. We construct three variables to capture a firm's innovation activity.
First, we use the number of patent applications (patent counts) that are eventually granted as the measure of a firm's innovation volume. However, patent counts are subject to a truncation bias. Second, to further measure the importance of a firm's innovation activity, citation-based measures are utilized. Patent citations also suffer a time truncation bias. Patents keep receiving citations for many years after they are granted, because of the finite length of the sample, patents granted in later years have less time to accumulate citations than patents granted in earlier years.
We follow Hall et al. (2005) to adjust citations of each patent by multiplying the weighting index estimated by the empirical distribution of the total citations in the same technology class using untruncated data to deal with the time truncation bias. We use two citation-based measures in this paper. The first one is the citation counts, which is the total number of citations summed across all patent applications that are eventually granted during each firm-year. Because the expected citation contains information about both innovation volume and quality, we use it as a proxy of a firm's innovation power. The second measure is the number of citations per patent, which captures the average quality of patents.
Furthermore, we follow innovation literature to use the natural logarithm transform of innovativeness measures. To avoid losing firm-year observations with zero patents or zero citations, we use one plus the actual values when taking the natural logarithm.
Measure of technological proximity
Technological proximity measures the similarity of two firms' innovation activities in the technology space. Following the literature, we use the Jaffe measure (Jaffe 1986) to estimate the technological proximity between two firms. This measure characterizes a firm's innovation activities by the distribution of its patents in 426 technology classes classified by the USPTO.
Then, the technological proximity between firm i and firm j is defined as the uncentered correlation between the two firms' technology activities:
where T i =(T i1 , T i2 ,..., T i426 ) and T it is the average share of patents of firm i in technology class t over 30 years prior to the appointment.
Measures of outside directorships
Since the BoardEX keeps adding new firms in their database, the number of outside directorships recorded in the database may increase because more firms' board profiles have been covered in the database rather than the CEO actually accepts new directorships. To deal with this bias, we only count a CEO's outside directorships in S&P 1500 firms since the coverage of S&P 1500 firms in the BoardEX is relatively stable.
As mentioned earlier, innovative firms may have higher advisory needs for innovative CEO directors, meanwhile non-innovative firms may not have interest in innovative CEOs because their unique knowledge and experience related to innovation is less useful for these firms. To take into account the advisory needs of the appointing firm, we calculate the weighted number of outside directorships as follows:
The weighted number of outside
where 1 it refers to one directorship a CEO holds in firm i at time t, Ranking i is the decile ranking of the appointing firm's citation counts in its Fama-French 49 industry classification at the beginning year of the sample 3 .
Control variables
We first control for several firm characteristics that prior research suggests as factors affecting the number of outside directorships held by CEOs. Booth and Deli (1996) suggest that larger firms have more external contracting relationships and thus will benefit more from building well-bonded relationships trough serving as outside directors on other firms' board. In addition, from the demand side, CEOs of large firms can bring higher certification effect to the appointing firms. As a result, CEOs from large firms should hold more outside directorships. They also find that that CEOs of firms with more growth opportunities hold fewer outside directorships because their time are more valuable. Fich (2005) presents similar empirical results to support this view. Similar to this finding, it is reasonable to expect that CEOs of firms investing more on capital expenditures and with higher sales growth are less likely to accept outside directorships. However, the value of high growth potential firms is highly relied on realising their future opportunities, this may impose heightened pressure on the CEO to certify their ability.
Based on the career concern hypothesis, CEOs of these firms are more likely to accept external directorships as the certification of their ability. Fama and Jensen (1983) posit that individuals obtain outside directorships when the external labour market for directors recognizes their valuable decision management skills in their own firms. Therefore, CEOs of well-performing 3 The innovation ranking of each appointing firm is fixed at the beginning year of the sample to make sure the change of a CEO's weighted number of directorships will be fully owing to new appointment or quit.
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firms are more likely to be appointed as outside directors. Ferris et al. (2003) and Fich (2005) find empirical evidence to support this view. Furthermore, Fahlenbrach et al. (2010) argue that CEOs working at older and more mature firms who have delegated more of their authority to younger managers are more likely to accept outside directorships. Therefore, we control for firm size, firm age, capital expenditures, sales growth, market-to-book and return on assets. In addition, Knyazeva et al. (2013) demonstrate that the local supply of prospective directors has an important effect on a firm's director appointment process. We further include the local director pool variable to control for the local supply of directors, this variable can reflect the local competitiveness of outside directorship market and thus affect the number of directorships held by a CEO. We also control for other firm characteristics including cash, leverage, dividend and capital intensity to rule out possible effect on the number of directorships held by CEOs.
Next, we control for CEO characteristics that are shown to affect their attractiveness on the directorship market or affect their willingness to accept outside directorships. CEO age and education could proxy for CEO knowledge and experience. CEO tenure reflects the cost to the sender firm 4 of a CEO accepting outside directorships. For CEOs with longer tenure, this cost decreases because they have transfer more decision rights to younger managers or their eventual successors (Booth and Deli 1996) . Last, we also include several board characteristics in our analysis. Following Booth and Deli (1996) , we control for board size, director ownership, CEO duality and number of board interlocks. Board size reflects the complexity of a firm's external contracting relationships, thus firms with larger boards will benefit more from outside directorships CEOs hold. In addition, large boards may have less intensive monitoring, thus decreasing CEOs' cost of holding outside directorships. Higher director ownership increases the board monitoring, therefore it increases CEO's cost of holding outside directorships. CEOs who are also chairmen have more control power so that they have more freedom to accept outside directorships, and external firms are more willing to build better relationships with them because of their importance in the firms.
Consequently, CEO duality increases the number of directorships a CEO holds. As the number of board interlocks reflects a firm's tendency to build bonded relationships with other firms, it 4 Sender firm refers to a CEO's primary employing firm.
14 is positively related with the number of directorships held by its CEOs.
In the BoardEX database, a firm's new directors will be added in its board profile at the end of the fiscal year. To make sure that all explanatory variables capture the information before the director appointment or leave, we measure the number of directorships a CEO holds at year t and measure all explanatory variables at year t-1. Furthermore, we winsorize all nonbinary variables at 1% level for both tails in case that the outliers drive our results. All variable definitions are presented in the Appendix. Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for variables used in our analysis. We categorize sender firms into two groups, one is the innovative firm (defined as the firm with at least one patent outcome during the sample period), the other is the non-innovative firm (defined as the firm with no patent outcome during the sample period). To further distinguish the level of innovativeness, we sort all innovative firms into quartile groups on the basis of their patent outcome.
Descriptive statistics
Our sample shows consistent results of the proposed hypotheses. CEOs of more innovative firms significantly hold more outside directorships, and the appointing firms they serve in are also more innovative. The mean number of outside directorships held by CEOs of innovative firms in the sample is 0.41. In contrast, CEOs of non-innovative firms in the sample hold 0.26 outside directorships on average. Furthermore, CEOs in the top quartile hold 0.30 more outside directorships than CEOs in the bottom quartile. Meanwhile, the appointing firms that innovative CEOs serve in receive 59.05 patents with 15.65 citations per patent averagely, and the appointing firms that non-innovative CEOs serve in only generate 9.12 patents with 8.70 citations per patent on average. Both of mean and median differences between two groups are significant at conventional levels. The descriptive statistics suggest that CEOs of more innovative firms hold more outside directorships. However, at this stage, we cannot attribute this pattern just to firm innovativeness, as other factors could potentially explain the number of outside directorships held by CEOs.
Our results also show that CEOs holding more outside directorships are younger but have better education background, they have been CEO for shorter years and work in larger firms that have more growth opportunities, hold more cash and invest more in R&D expenses. The firms they work in also have more board members and are more likely to build bonding relationships with other firms through interlocking. To sum up, our descriptive statistics yield evidence similar to previous studies on the driven factors of the number of directorships held by CEOs.
Do CEOs of innovative firms hold more outside directorships?
In this section, we empirically test whether firm innovativeness determines the number of outside directorships held by a CEO.
Instrumental variable
One possible concern is that the association between firm innovativeness and the number of outside directorships held by CEOs is the result of endogeneity. If there are omitted variables or unobservables that affect firm innovativeness as well as the number of outside directorships, then the estimation will be biased. For example, recent studies find that CEOs with better managerial ability produce better innovation outcomes (Chemmanur et al. 2014 , Cho et al. 2016 , Custodio et al. 2015 , although we control for several factors that can reflect a CEO's managerial ability, there is still a chance that the association between firm innovativeness and the number of outside directorships held by CEOs is driven by unobserved CEO managerial ability. To address this endogeneity, we use urban industrial diversity as the exogenous variable to instrument our firm innovativeness measures. Urban industrial diversity is defined as one minus the Herfindahl index of local employment across two-digit industries in the county where the firm headquartered. In this section, we argue that our instrumental variable is both relevant to firm innovativeness and it satisfies the exclusion restriction in the sense that it cannot directly 16 affect the number of outside directorships held by CEOs.
For the instrument to be valid, it must strongly affect firm innovativeness. Prior literature highlights that most innovations are made and spread in cities since the flow of ideas and information is easier. The diversification of industries in urban area facilitates knowledge spillovers across industries by reducing searching costs of cross-industry inspirations and expertise, as well as provision of alternative components on their new products. Glaeser et al. (1992) find that local diversification of industries and local competition, rather than local specialization, can encourage employment growth in industries. This finding suggests that within-industry knowledge spillovers are not as important as cross-industry knowledge spillovers for urban growth. Duranton and Puga (2001) build a theoretical model to explain how urban industrial diversity can help foster innovation. They show that, because of the uncertainty of innovation, a firm needs to experiment to find out the full potential of their innovation projects. This process may need knowledge across industries. A firms located in the area with diversified industries can reduce their searching costs of cross-industry knowledge, for example, it is easier to find industrial experts to hire or to try different components on their new products, and therefore enhance a firm's ability to generate better innovation outcomes. Consistent with this evidence, our firststage results, presented in Panel 2 of Table 2, show that local diversity has a strong effect on firm innovativeness. A valid instrument also needs to satisfy the exclusion restriction. Economically, we do not observe any clear rationale for how urban industrial diversity can directly affect the number of directorships held by a CEO. At the same time, we are not aware of any prior literature that suggests direct impact of urban industrial diversity on a CEO's outside directorship. Although it is not possible to directly test the exclusion restriction, we run a placebo test by including the instrument itself in the second stage regression. If the exclusion restriction is violated, the instrument could affect the dependent variable through channels other than influencing firm innovativeness and we would observe statistically significant coefficient on the instrumental variable. For brevity, we do not report the results of the placebo test, but the results are consistent with the notion that that the instrumental variable we choose only affects the dependent variable through its impact on firm innovativeness.
Regression analysis and results
Are CEOs of innovative firms more likely to hold outside directorships?
We begin our analysis by investigating how a firm's innovativeness affects its CEO's probability of being an outside director in other firms. To answer this question, we use a probit model where the dependent variable is equal to 0 if a CEO does not hold any outside directorships, and 1 if a CEO holds at least one outside directorship.
Model (1) (3) of Table 2 present the results of the probit regressions. All regressions include controls for firm characteristics, CEO characteristics and other factors highlighted in prior literature that can affect a CEO's probability of holding outside directorships through both supply and demand sides. We also include year and industry dummies (using Fama-French 49 industry classifications) to control for potential time trends and time-invariant industry heterogeneity.
The results confirm our conjecture, the coefficients on all three firm innovativeness measures are positive and significant at the conventional level, suggesting that CEOs of more innovative firms are more likely to hold outside directorships. We also observe that CEOs holding outside directorships are older, better educated, and from larger and more mature firms who prefer to build bonding relationships with other firms through board interlocking, consistent with findings in prior literature. Our results still hold after correcting potential endogeneity. As shown in Model (4) (6) of Table 2 , we continue to find significantly positive effect of firm innovativeness on a CEO's probability of holding outside directorships.
We next ask how the appointing firms' innovativeness can affect an innovative CEO's probability of holding outside directorships. Based on our supply and demand analysis of innovative CEO-directors, we conjecture that innovative CEOs are more likely to hold outside directorships in innovative firms. To examine this prediction, we estimate a set of multinomial regression models where the dependent variable (Y ) is a categorical variable constructed by a CEO's different choices of holding outside directorships. First, we sort our sample into two groups, one includes CEOs who do not hold any outside directorships (non-director group, Y =0), the other consists of CEOs holding at least one outside directorships (CEO-director group, Y =1 or Y =2). We then sort the CEO-director sample by the appointing firms' innovativeness (measured by citation counts), and further divide the sample into two sub-groups (i.e., high innovative appointing firms group (Y =2) and low innovative appointing firms group (Y =1)) based on the sample median. We report the regression estimates in Panel A of Table 3 . We observe that CEOs of more innovative firms prefer to hold outside directorships in high innovative firms, which is in line with our prediction. In addition, besides splitting appointing firms by their innovativeness, we sort the CEO-director sample by the appointing firms' R&D as well. As presented in Panel B of Table 3 , we find that innovative CEOs are more likely to join the board of R&D-intensive firms.
Last, we assess the technological proximity between the sender firm and the appointing firm.
The technological proximity is particularly of interest because it can reflect the matching of the appointing firm's advisory needs and the innovative CEO-director's expertise. The prior literature suggests that directors are particularly sought after when they can provide valuable expertise that can match the appointing firm's advisory needs 5 . Therefore, we should observe that innovative CEO-directors hold outside directorships in firms with high technology proximity to their own firms. To examine this prediction, we estimate the similar multinomial regression where we divide the CEO-director sample by the technological proximity between the sender firm and the appointing firm. In Panel C of Table 3 , our results confirm the prediction. We show that CEOs of more innovative firms are less likely to serve as outside director in firms with low technological proximity to their own firms, and they tend to hold outside directorships in firms with high technological proximity to their own firms. We can also interpret this finding using the theory suggested by Fahlenbrach et al. (2010) . CEO-directors face high opportunity cost of time and high reputation cost. If they join boards of firms that they are familiar with, the required workload and potential reputation risk would be less. Therefore, innovative CEO-directors are likely to join firms with high technological proximity to their own firms.
Innovativeness and the number of outside directorships held by a CEO
In this subsection, we directly test how a firm's innovativeness affects the number of outside directorships held by its CEO, Because the number of outside directorships is left censored, Tobit models are utilized in our regression analysis. As discussed in the earlier section, we use two different measures of outside directorships, one is the actual number of outside directorships, the other is the weighted number of outside directorships.
Panel A of Table 4 reports the results estimated by using the actual number of outside directorships as the dependent variable. Consistent with our theoretical prediction and univariate analysis, firm innovativeness is associated with significantly more number of directorships held by a CEO. The coefficients of all three firm innovativeness measures are significantly positive, both before and after correcting potential endogeneity. The coefficients associated with control variables are also economically and statistically in line with prior studies and our prediction. We observe that CEOs of larger and older firms hold more outside directorships, and these firms are more likely to build bonding relationship with other firms through director interlocking, which is consistent with the idea in Booth and Deli (1996) demonstrating that large and established firms face more complex external contracting relationships and thus will benefit more from sending their CEOs to serve on other firms' board. Similar to Ferris et al. (2003) , the coefficient on CEO age is significantly positive. We further find significantly positive effect of CEO education on number of outside directorships held by a CEO. This suggests that CEOs with more experience and better knowledge background are more popular on the directorship market.
We now turn to the regression analysis using the weighted number of outside directorships as the dependent variable. Our purpose here is not only to examine whether innovative CEOs hold more outside directorships, but also to take into account the matching of a CEO-director's expertise and the appointing firm's advisory needs. Using our weighting method, one outside directorship in more innovative appointing firms will weigh more in the total number of outside directorships, it therefore captures both the number and the quality of outside directorships held by a CEO. As shown in Panel B of Table 4 , the effect of firm innovativeness remains qualitatively unchanged and becomes more pronounced. The coefficients on all firm innovativeness 20 measures are significantly positive at the 1% level. This finding is consistent with our supply and demand analysis of innovative CEO-directors. From the supply side, innovative CEO-directors' expertise are especially valuable for innovative appointing firms. From the demand side, CEOs of innovative firms can also benefit more from serving as outside directors in innovative firms.
Overall, our regression analysis is in line with our theoretical prediction, suggesting that CEOs of more innovative firms hold more outside directorships and this pattern is more pronounced when the appointing firms are innovative.
Robustness tests
The results presented above provide empirical evidence of a strong causal relation between a firm's innovativeness and the number of outside directorships held by its CEO. In this section, we conduct several additional tests to examine the robustness of this finding.
Innovation efficiency
Patent counts and citation counts only capture the outcome of a firm's innovation activities, it is also interesting to assess the impact of a firm's innovation input and innovation efficiency on the number of outside directorships held by its CEO because such efficiency can reflect a CEO's ability of producing innovation outcome with a reasonable cost. Following innovation literature, we construct three measures of a firm's innovation efficiency by scaling a firm's patent count, citation count and citations per patent by its R&D capital, which is the cumulative R&D expenses over the preceding 5 years with an annual depreciation rate of 20% 6 . In Table 5 , we report the regression estimates of Tobit models further including corresponding innovation efficiency measures and R&D intensity. We continue observing significantly positive coefficients on innovation outcome measures in most of the regressions. In some regressions, the coefficients on innovation efficiency measures are significantly positive as well. However, we do not find significant relation between R&D intensity and the number of outside directorships. Together these results suggest that innovation outcome is more important than innovation efficiency and innovation input for deciding the number of outside directorships held by a CEO.
Addressing reverse causality
One possible concern is that if a firm becomes more innovative because its CEO enhances her ability through seating on other firms' boards, the effect of firm innovativeness on the outside directorships we observed could be attributable to reverse causality. To alleviate this concern, rather than use the innovation outcome at t 1, we use the the innovation outcome at t 3 instead. As presented in Panel A of Table 6 , the significantly positive coefficients associated with the lagged innovation outcome confirm that our main finding are unlikely to be driven by reverse causality.
Self-citations
Hall et al. (2005) contends that self-citations are more valuable than external citations. They suggest that self-citations could reflect the strong competitiveness of a firm in a particular technology class and a firm's ability to internalize the knowledge spillovers rather than to acquire externally. Based on this suggestion, we do not exclude self-citations when we assess the impact of patents. However, much of the innovation literature, such as Chemmanur et al. (2014) , Hirshleifer et al. (2013) and Faleye et al. (2014) , use non-self-citations to measure the impact of patents. To examine whether our findings are sensitive to self-citations, we further exclude self-citations in our analysis and the results remain similar (see Panel B of Table 6 ).
CEO overconfidence, CEO ownerships and board ownerships
The prior studies provide evidence to suggest that CEO overconfidence can affect firm innovativeness and his willingness to accept outside directorship (Hirshleifer et al. 2012 , Galasso and Simcoe 2011 , Beavers and Mobbs 2015 . In addition, much of research (Booth and Deli 1996 , Fahlenbrach et al. 2010 , Perry and Peyer 2005 contends that CEO and board ownership could affect the number of directorships held by CEOs. CEOs with low ownership may have poor incentives to maximize shareholder value, thus could be more willing to accept outside directorships. Moreover, high board ownership could increase the intensity of board monitoring, so they are less likely to allow CEOs to spend their time on outside directorship jobs. Motivated by these findings, we further control for CEO overconfidence 7 , CEO ownership and board ownership. As presented in Panel C of Table 6 , the results remain largely consistent.
Firm random effect
In this subsection, we estimate firm-level random effects Tobit models to check whether our results are driven by time-invariant unobservable firm characteristics. We employed random effects rather than fixed effects due to the use of maximum likelihood in estimating the Tobit model. According to the results presented in Panel D of Table 6 , using firm random effect weakens our results, this is not surprising as the number of outside directorships held by CEOs is sticky at the firm level over time.
5 Impact of innovative CEO-directors on firm performance
Innovation performance
In this section, we examine whether the presence of innovative CEO-directors on the board can impact a firm's innovation performance. To assess this effect, we exploit a difference-indifference regression using a panel data set that contains information of firms in the treatment group and control group during three pre-appointment years and three post-appointment years.
We allow a two-year gap between the pre-appointment years and the post-appointment years since it takes time for a firm to convert innovation input to patenting output. We construct a treatment sample including CEO-director appointments in which an innovative firm (firms with non-zero patent outcome during the sample period) appointing an innovative CEO-director (CEOs of firms with non-zero patent outcome during the sample period), and a control sample including CEO-director appointments in which an innovative firm appointing a non-innovative CEO-director (CEOs of firms with zero patent outcome during the sample period). In this way, we can rule out the performance change due to the appointment of any type of CEO-directors and allow us to attribute the performance change to the innovativeness of CEO-directors. We apply the similar regression specification used in Bena and Li (2014) and Seru (2014) as follows 8 Innovation
where the subscripts refer to firm i and year t. After is an indicator variable that equals one for all the years after the appointment and zero otherwise. Treat is an indicator variable that equals one for firms in the treatment group and zero for firms in the control group. We include firm fixed effect in the specification to control for any time-invariant heterogeneity among firms. We also include year fixed effects to control for possible common trend affecting innovation output in both the treatment and control groups.
Before the formal analysis, we first explain the sample construction of the treatment and control groups. In our whole sample, there are 550 unique CEOs who hold outside directorships during the sample period. We use the BoardEX database to find out all appointing firms and the time when they appointed outside CEOs as directors, and then remove the appointing firms that do not have enough data around the appointment. Next, we further remove the appointing firms receiving zero patent over the sample period to make sure that all appointing firms are actively We now turn to explain the results of our difference-in-difference analysis. Panel A of Table   7 reports the OLS regression estimates of Equation (4). We show that the coefficients on the interaction term After ⇥ Treat i,t is positive and significant at the 5% level in the regressions on citation counts and expected citations per patent. The results are still robust when we include several firm characteristic variables in the regressions. Although we fail to observe similar effect in the regressions on patent counts, our results suggest that appointing innovative-CEO directors leads to significant improvement of a firm's innovation quality.
To further assess how much of the observed improvement in the treatment group can be attributed to different characteristics of both the sender firm and the appointing firm, we use a difference-in-difference-in-difference specification. First, we sort all sender firms in the treatment group into high innovativeness group and low innovativeness group by the sample median of sender firm's pre-appointment innovation outcomes. In Panel B of Table 7 , we add interaction term After i,t ⇥ Treat i,t ⇥ High Innovativeness i,t to the specification above. The significantly positive coefficients on this interaction term indicate that the observed effect in the treatment group is largely driven by the level of a CEO-director's innovativeness, which suggests that appointing an outside CEO from high innovative firms as a director can significantly increase both patent counts and citation counts generated in the post-appointment years.
Next, we move to explore how technological proximity between the appointing firm and the sender firm can affect the innovation performance of the appointing firm. High technological proximity between two firms suggests that their innovation activities are overlapping to some certain degree. Such overlap can help fill the information gap between directors and incumbent managers, leading to more valuable advices provided by directors. In Panel C of Table 7, we add interaction term After i,t ⇥ Treat i,t ⇥ High Proximity i,t to the specification mentioned in Equation (4). High Proximity is an indicator variable that takes value one if the technological proximity between the sender firm and the appointing firm is larger than the sample median of the treatment group and zero otherwise. We only observe significantly positive coefficients on the interaction term After i,t ⇥ Treat i,t ⇥ High Proximity i,t when we use citation counts and citations per patent to measure a firm's innovation outcomes, suggesting that the impact of CEO-directors from firms with high technological proximity is mainly on the quality of patents.
Finally, we examine how much of the improvement of innovation outcomes in the treatment group is due to the level of appointing firm's R&D intensity. Similarly, we split the treatment sample into two groups by the sample median R&D intensity and include After i,t ⇥ Treat i,t ⇥ High R&D i,t in the specification. As can be observed in Panel D of Table 7 , only the increase of citations per patent can be attributed to the level of appointing firm's R&D intensity.
In summary, we conclude that the presence of innovative CEO-directors on a firm's board can significantly improve its innovation performance in the post-appointment years. In addition, we find that the degree of improvement depends on the level of the sender firm's innovativeness, the technological proximity between two firms, and the level of the appointing firm's R&D intensity.
Operating performance
We have shown that the presence of innovative CEO-directors on a firm's board can significantly improve the firm's innovation performance in the post-appointment years. In this section, we examine whether this improved innovation performance can be converted to better operating performance. We use the same sample of 205 CEO-director appointments in the post-appointment innovation performance test and investigate the post-appointment operating performance of the firms in the treat sample and the control sample separately. The treat sample includes CEO-director appointments in which an innovative firm (firms with non-zero patent outcome during the sample period) appointed an innovative CEO-director (CEOs of firms with non-zero patent outcome during the sample period), while the control sample includes CEOdirector appointments in which an innovative firm appointed a non-innovative CEO-director (CEOs of firms with zero patent outcome during the sample period). We apply the similar regression specification used in Healy et al. (1992) and Harford (1999) as follows:
Post-appointment operating performance i =a + b Pre-appointment operating performance i
where i indexes firms; Pre-appointment operating performance is the average operating performance over 3 years before the appointment. Post-appointment operating performance is the average operating performance over event years +2 to +4 (or +2 to +6) after the appointment. 9 Year Dummies is a vector of binary variables indicating event years. Industry Dummies is a vector of binary variables indicating industries defined using Fama-French 49 industries.
b captures the persistence of pre-appointment operating performance. a captures any abnormal operating performance improvements between the pre-appointment and post-appointment periods.
Barber and Lyon (1996) point out that when studying operating performance, it is important to control for abnormal firm characteristics. This adjustment will remove the effects of several firm characteristics on post-event abnormal operating performance, and attributes any postevent abnormal operating performance to the event itself. Following Barber and Lyon (1996) , we use return on assets (ROA) to measure operating performance and then adjust ROA by two methods. First, we adjust a firm's ROA by the median ROA of firms in the same Fama-French 49 industry and size decile. Second, we adjust a firm's ROA by the ROA of a matched firm that is from the same Fama-French 49 industry with ROA in event year 3 that is within ± 10% of the appointing firm and closest in size to the appointing firm.
In Panel A of Table 8 , we report the regression estimates of post-appointment operating performance using post-appointment 3-year (event year +2 to +4) average operating performance.
As reported in Model (1) and (2), the regressions using unadjusted ROA show that the abnormal operating performance associated with the appointment is significantly positive for both the treat sample and the control sample. However, the constant term for the treat firms is more significant (at the 1% level) than that for the control firms (at the 10% level), and its magni-tude is larger as well, which indicates the treat firms outperform the control firms in terms of the abnormal operating performance. When we further adjust the ROA by firm characteristics including size, industry and past performance, the discrepancy of abnormal operating performance between the treat groups and the control groups becomes more pronounced. Specifically, as shown in Model (5) and (6), the treat firms on average have a significantly positive abnormal operating performance of 10.3% a year. In contrast, the control firms on average have a significant negative abnormal operating performance of 4.2% a year. The difference between two groups is both statistically and economically significant. Further, we also observe that the coefficient on pre-event operating performance for the treat firms is much smaller than that for the control firms, suggesting that appointing an innovative CEO-director brings more dramatic change on a firm's operating performance than appointing an non-innovative CEO-director. In addition, the estimates of similar regressions using 5-year (event year +2 to +6) average operating performance are reported in Panel B of Table 8 , where we find very similar results.
Overall, our results show that the presence of innovative CEO-directors on the board not only improve a firm's innovation performance but also enhance its financial performance, which further suggests that enhanced innovation capacity translates to value enhancement for shareholders.
Conclusion
In this paper, we investigate whether a CEO's proven ability of cultivating and promoting innovation in their own firm can be recognized by the outside directorship market, and whether this expertise and ability enables the appointing firms to improve their innovation and financial performance. We find that CEOs of innovative firms are particularly sought after as outside directors. They are more likely to hold outside directorships than CEOs of non-innovative firms and the number of outside directorships held by them is positively associated with their own firm's innovation performance.
Theories suggest that innovative CEO-directors should be particularly sought after for advice 28 when their expertise are valuable for the appointing firms. Meanwhile, CEOs of innovative firms are more likely to join firms that can provide them prestige, network and knowledge that enhance their career and performance of their own firms. We provide evidence consistent with this prediction. In our performance analysis, we further demonstrate that innovative CEO-director appointment significantly improves the appointing firms innovation and financial performance.
We conclude that the skill of cultivating and promoting innovation is an attribute highly valued in the outside director market. Further, the supply of innovative CEO-directors provides an important conduit for knowledge transmission across innovative firms. Innovativeness and a CEO's probability of holding outside directorship: the impact of appointing firms' innovativeness This table reports multinomial probit regression estimates of how appointing firms' innovativeness can affect a CEO's probability of holding outside directorship. In panel A, panel B and panel C, the dependent variable equals 0 if a CEO does not hold any outside directorship. In panel A, the dependent variable equals 1 if a CEO holds outside directorships in firms whose citation counts are smaller than the sample median, 2 if a CEO holds outside directorships in firms whose citation counts are larger than the sample median. In panel B, the dependent variable equals 1 if a CEO holds outside directorships in firms whose technological proximity to the CEO's own firm is smaller than the sample median, 2 if a CEO holds outside directorships in firms whose technological proximity to the CEO's own firm is larger than the sample median. In panel C, the dependent variable equals 1 if a CEO holds outside directorships in firms whose R&D intensity is smaller than the sample median, 2 if a CEO holds outside directorships in firms whose R&D intensity is larger than the sample median. In all panels, the dependent is measured at year t and all independent variables are measured at year t-1. Control variables included in the regressions but unreported for brevity are ln(Total assets), Market-to-book, Return on assets, Cash, Leverage, CAPEX, Dividend, Sales growth, Capital intensity, ln(Firm age), ln(CEO age), ln(CEO tenure), CEO education, Board size, CEO duality, Interlock, and ln(1 + Number of local firms). Variable definitions are in Appendix. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and within industry and year clustering. Industry classification is based on the Fama-French 49-industry classification. The p-values are in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively. Table 7 : Post-appointment innovation performance This table reports the estimates of the effect of an innovative CEO-director appointment on the appointing firm's innovation performance. The estimates from OLS regression using a difference-in-difference specification are presented in this table. The dependent variable is the appointing firm's annual innovation outcome from t-3, skipping year t and t+1, to t+4, where t is the year of appointment. The unit of observation is a firm-year. After is a dummy variable that equals 1 after the appointment and 0 otherwise. Treat is a dummy variable that equals 1 for the treatment group (sender firm has non-zero innovation outcomes) and 0 for the control group (sender firm has zero innovation outcomes). High Innovativeness is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the sender firm's innovation outcomes over three years prior to the appointment are larger than the median value of all sender firms in the treatment group and 0 otherwise. High proximity is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the technological proximity between the sender firm and the appointing firm is larger than the sample median of the treatment group and 0 otherwise. High R&D is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the appointing firm's R&D intensity over three years prior to the appointment are larger than the median value of all appointing firms in the treatment group and 0 otherwise. Control variables included in the regressions but unreported for brevity are ln(Total assets), Market-to-book, Return on assets, Cash, Leverage, and R&D. Variables are defined in Appendix. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and within firm and year clustering. Industry classification is based on the Fama-French 49-industry classification. The p-values are in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively. of a firm's post-appointment abnormal operating performance. The dependent variable is the average annual operating performance over 3 years or 5 years skipping a gap of two years after the appointment of an innovative CEO-director. The independent variable is the average annual operating performance over 3 years before the appointments. In model (1) and (2), a firm's operating performance is measured by unadjusted ROA (defined in Appendix). In model (3) and (4), a firm's operating performance is measured by ROA adjusted by the median ROA of firms in the same Fama-French 49 industry and size decile. In model (5) and (6), a firm's operating performance is measured by ROA adjusted by the ROA of a matched firm that is from the same Fama-French 49 industry with an ROA in event year 3 that is within ± 10% of the appointing firm and that is closet in size. We also report p-values of Chow tests comparing the structural difference and statistical equality of the constant term across the treat group regression and the control group regression. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and within year and industry clustering. Industry classification is based on the Fama-French 49-industry classification. The p-values are in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively. Test of equality across two regressions (Chow test) Structural difference (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** Equality of the constant term (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.029)** Indicator variable equals 1 for all years after a CEO holds options that are at least 67% in the money, and 0 otherwise. Number of local firms
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Instrumented
The number of U.S. nonfinancial and nonutility firms headquartered within sixty miles of the firm's headquarters, excluding firms in the same 4-digit SIC industry.
Urban industrial diversity
One minus the Herfindahl index of local employment across two-digit industries in the county where the firm headquartered.
